Meta-ethics Study Guide

📖 Core Concepts Metaethics – The second‑order study of moral language, judgment, and values (what “good” means, whether moral knowledge is possible). Cognitivism vs. Non‑cognitivism – Cognitivists say moral sentences state propositions that can be true/false; non‑cognitivists say they express attitudes or prescriptions, not truth‑apt. Moral Realism vs. Anti‑realism – Realism: moral facts exist independent of minds (naturalist or non‑naturalist). Anti‑realism: no mind‑independent moral facts (subjectivism, error theory, non‑cognitivism). Universalism vs. Relativism – Universalism holds a single moral standard applies everywhere; relativism holds standards vary by culture or individual. Value Monism vs. Pluralism – Monism: all values can be reduced to one scale; pluralism: multiple, incommensurable value scales exist. Moral Epistemology – How we know moral truths: Empiricism (observation), Rationalism (a priori reason), Intuitionism (direct non‑inferential insight), Skepticism (no moral knowledge). Thin vs. Thick Concepts – Thin: abstract terms (good, wrong). Thick: content‑rich terms (courageous, unjust) that embed descriptive content. Centralism vs. Non‑centralism – Centralists: thin concepts are prior and needed to understand thick concepts. Non‑centralists: thin and thick concepts can be grasped simultaneously. --- 📌 Must Remember Metaethics deals with meaning, ontology, and epistemology of moral judgments. Cognitivist ⇒ moral sentences are truth‑apt; Non‑cognitivist ⇒ not truth‑apt. Moral realism = mind‑independent moral facts; Anti‑realism = denial of such facts. Naturalist realism = moral properties reducible to natural facts; Non‑naturalist realism = irreducible moral properties. Ethical subjectivism (cognitivist) = truth depends on attitudes/conventions. Error theory = all moral propositions are false (no moral properties). Ideal observer theory = moral truth = what a perfectly rational, fully informed observer would endorse. Divine command theory = moral rightness = divine approval. Universalism ↔ Relativism are opposites on the scope of moral standards. Value pluralism ⇒ some conflicts cannot be resolved by a single metric. Moral intuitionism ⇒ some moral truths are known directly, without inference. Moral skepticism ⇒ no one has moral knowledge (often claims it’s impossible). Centralism: thin concepts → prerequisite for thick concepts. Non‑centralism: thin & thick concepts are on a parity; thick concepts can ground thin ones. --- 🔄 Key Processes Evaluating a Metaethical Theory Identify: (a) Semantic stance (cognitivist vs. non‑cognitivist). (b) Ontological commitment (realist vs. anti‑realist; naturalist vs. non‑naturalist). (c) Epistemological claim (empiricist, rationalist, intuitionist, skeptic). Distinguishing Thin vs. Thick Concepts Spot a term: is it abstract (good) or descriptive (courageous)? Ask: does the term carry factual content besides normative evaluation? Choosing Between Universalism & Relativism Check if the moral claim is intended to apply globally (universal) or is culture‑specific (relativist). --- 🔍 Key Comparisons Cognitivism vs. Non‑cognitivism Cognitivism: moral sentences = propositions → can be true/false. Non‑cognitivism: moral sentences = expressions of attitudes/prescriptions → not truth‑apt. Moral Realism vs. Anti‑realism Realism: moral facts exist independently of minds. Anti‑realism: denies mind‑independent moral facts. Naturalist vs. Non‑naturalist Realism Naturalist: moral properties reducible to natural/empirical properties. Non‑naturalist: moral properties irreducible, known a priori or intuitively. Universalism vs. Relativism Universalism: one moral standard for all people/time. Relativism: moral standards vary by society/individual. Value Monism vs. Value Pluralism Monism: single scale measures all values. Pluralism: multiple, incommensurable scales; some conflicts unsolvable by comparison. Thin vs. Thick Concepts Thin: abstract, minimal content (good, wrong). Thick: rich descriptive content (courageous, unjust). Centralism vs. Non‑centralism Centralist: thin concepts must be understood first. Non‑centralist: thin and thick concepts can be learned together. --- ⚠️ Common Misunderstandings “All cognitivists are realists.” – False. Ethical subjectivism is cognitivist but anti‑realist. “Non‑cognitivism denies moral meaning.” – It denies truth‑aptness, not that moral language is meaningless. “Error theory says moral statements are meaningless.” – Incorrect; it says they are false because truthmakers don’t exist. “Universalism always means realism.” – Not; there are universalist subjectivist and prescriptivist accounts. “Intuitionism = rationalism.” – Intuitionism can be rationalist or empiricist (the “moral sense” variety). --- 🧠 Mental Models / Intuition “Three‑layer metaethical cake” – Semantics (cognitivist ↔ non‑cognitivist) → what moral language does. Ontology (realism ↔ anti‑realism) → what moral facts are. Epistemology (empiricist ↔ rationalist ↔ intuitionist ↔ skeptic) → how we (could) know them. “Thin‑to‑thick ladder” – Centralists view thin concepts as the first rung; non‑centralists see the ladder as a net where any rung can be a starting point. --- 🚩 Exceptions & Edge Cases Non‑realist cognitivism – Ethical subjectivism treats moral statements as truth‑apt but truth depends on attitudes, not mind‑independent facts. Quasi‑realism – Non‑cognitivist approach that pretends moral statements are true/false to preserve ordinary discourse. Ideal observer theory – Hybrid: truth‑apt (cognitivist) but grounded in a hypothetical observer, not a mind‑independent fact. --- 📍 When to Use Which If a question asks whether moral statements can be true/false → test cognitivist vs. non‑cognitivist. If asked about the existence of moral facts → choose realism vs. anti‑realism. When the issue is how we know morality → pick empiricism, rationalism, intuitionism, or skepticism. For cross‑cultural moral claims → decide between universalism and relativism. When evaluating a conflict between two values → consider value monism (single scale) vs. pluralism (multiple incommensurable scales). --- 👀 Patterns to Recognize “X theory claims moral truth is Y.” – The pattern “X = cognitivist/anti‑realist/etc.” helps map each theory quickly. “If a view is subjectivist it is automatically anti‑realist but cognitivist.” “Thick concepts = moral term + descriptive content.” – Spot adjectives like “courageous” → thick. “Universalist + realist → naturalist or non‑naturalist realism; universalist + anti‑realist → subjectivist or prescriptivist.” --- 🗂️ Exam Traps Confusing anti‑realism with non‑cognitivism – Remember anti‑realism denies mind‑independent facts; some anti‑realists (e.g., subjectivism) are still cognitivist. Mistaking error theory for relativism – Error theory says all moral statements are false, not merely culture‑dependent. Assuming “intuitionism = rationalism.” – The outline notes a rationalist variety and an empiricist “moral sense” variety. Choosing naturalist realism for any realist claim – Realism can be naturalist or non‑naturalist; the distinction hinges on reducibility to natural properties. Seeing “thin concepts are unimportant” – Centralist arguments treat them as foundational, not trivial. ---